防务回归中欧

在过去的三十多年里，欧洲的国防制造业一直处于巩固而非扩张的态势。生产线纷纷关闭，产能下降。政府将国防预算视为需要削减而非增加的支出，而国防物资储备则被视为政治上不合时宜的投资，因此该大陆逐渐习惯于将生产和在某些情况下甚至将战略依赖转移到其他国家。.

那个时代已经过去了。.

Since 2022, Europe’s defence industry has been rebuilding at a pace few analysts expected. EU ammunition production capacity alone rose from around 300,000 rounds a year in 2022 to an estimated 2 million by the end of 2025, a rate of industrial expansion that the Financial Times has described as three times faster than typical peacetime growth. In Germany, domestic defence orders rose by more than 50% in late 2025 compared with already-elevated post-invasion levels. Rheinmetall, once a mid-sized industrial name best known for automotive components, reported revenues of nearly €10 billion in 2024, with profits rising sharply and order backlogs stretching years out. Analysts now expect European defence company revenues, in aggregate, to grow by more than 10% annually for the next decade.

这一切在整个大陆上并不均衡地发生。在中东欧地区尤其如此，而原因对于任何考虑未来工业产能浪潮将涌向何处的人来说都是至关重要的。.

Key Takeaways 

• EU ammunition capacity rose from around 300,000 rounds a year in 2022 to an estimated 2 million by the end of 2025.
• Funding is large and dated: SAFE offers up to €150 billion of long-term loans, and EDIP provides €1.5 billion in grants for 2026 and 2027.
• The build-up is concentrated in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and the Baltics, close to the war in Ukraine and on top of dormant industrial know-how.
• Defence tenants need heavier floor loads, dangerous-goods permitting, high security and speed. The constraint is facilities that can be permitted and made operational fast enough.

为什么东方正在发展得更快？

地理因素显然是其中一个因素。波兰、斯洛伐克、匈牙利、罗马尼亚和波罗的海国家距离乌克兰战争最近，而这种距离直接转化为紧迫感。行业观察人士称，该地区的建设首先受到这种距离的驱动，而速度如今成为了决定性的制约因素：加快建设新增产能、加快提升现有产能，以及在作战需求不再需要时将新的防务产品推向市场。.

But there is a second, less obvious factor: much of this region has defence manufacturing in its industrial memory. Former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania were once significant arms exporters, supplying markets across the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. That industrial base didn’t disappear so much as go dormant. Rearmament is now reactivating it, and in several cases the underlying engineering knowledge, supplier relationships, and skilled labour pools never fully left.

The scale of the funding behind this shift is hard to overstate. The EU’s SAFE loan instrument makes roughly €150 billion available for defence procurement, with a firm 2030 delivery deadline and Poland positioned as one of the largest beneficiaries. Separately, the European Defence Industry Programme has launched with €1.5 billion for 2026 and 2027, split across industrial reinforcement, common procurement, and shared defence projects, all aimed at expanding manufacturing output and strengthening supply chains across the continent. The 2030 deadline attached to SAFE funding is not a suggestion. Given the lead times involved in both equipment delivery and the capacity investments needed to support it, meeting it will require compressing timelines that, under peacetime procurement rules, would normally take considerably longer.

Which Central European Countries Are Leading? 

一些最清晰的信号正在出现在国家层面：

• 匈牙利‘s Zrínyi 2026 program 匈牙利采取了独特的做法，从零开始构建重工业化，而非简单地吸引外资。与雷姆特公司合资生产Lynx步兵战车，使得匈牙利政府通过一家国有控股公司获得了49%的股权，而不仅仅是担任托管方。匈牙利也采取了类似的做法，收购了空中客车直升机公司在吉乌拉工厂的直接30%股权。.
• 波兰 波兰正在向装甲车、防空系统和反无人机系统扩展其能力，并已将其安全保障计划专项拨款中的超过20亿欧元用于乌克兰国防技术领域，尽管大部分资金仍需流向国内工业。波兰还已开始开发一种移动防无人机系统，该系统将结合传感器、电子战和拦截无人机技术。.
• 斯洛伐克 和 罗马尼亚 随着主要承包商寻求降低单一国家依赖性的风险，他们越来越多地参与大型平台的供应链，从车辆零部件到工程和物流支持。.
• 乌克兰 该项目正被直接融入欧洲国防工业基地，乌克兰自主研发的无人机生产线已在波兰、德国、波罗的海国家和英国投入运营，并计划在2026年建立十个乌克兰出口中心。.

What Does the Defence Boom Cover Beyond Tanks and Ammunition? 

在这轮重新武装过程中，其中一个更为有趣的转变在于其规模的扩大。追踪该领域的分析人士指出，至少有五个领域从增加的支出中受益，而这些领域的工业和技术能力各不相同。.

无人机和无人系统 无人机防御计划成为增长最快的细分市场。欧盟于2026年初启动的无人机防御计划旨在到2027年建立起覆盖全大陆的防无人机体系。德国制造商Quantum Systems的Vector无人机已在乌克兰进行过实战测试，成为该地区最突出的参与者之一。其军事和商业收入同步增长。德国和乌克兰于2026年4月签署了一项价值40亿欧元的防务协议，其中包括联合无人机生产。.

半导体和防务级电子设备 代表了一种令人不舒服的依赖关系，而欧洲如今正试图消除这种依赖关系。现代平台，从导弹制导系统到加密通信系统，都运行在先进的处理器上，而该大陆历来是从美国进口这些设备的，同时也将制造工作外包给了亚洲的工厂。EDIP的工业强化资金部分用于弥补这一缺口。.

金属密集型制造业 德国是其中受益者较为直接的领域之一。舰艇、装甲车、火炮系统和导弹发射器本质上都是金属制成的，分析人士估计，欧洲新增国防开支中约有40%将用于采购金属含量高的装备，这几乎是北约在该类装备上的典型标准的两倍。在这个领域，中欧现有重工业产能以及为此而训练的劳动力几乎可以直接转化为采购金属装备的能力。.

网络安全 近年来，网络安全产业悄然发展成为与国防相关的增长领域。截至2026年4月，欧洲网络安全收入同比增长了10%，其中身份和访问管理这一与保护政府和军事系统最直接相关的领域增长了18%。由于底层技术既面向军事用户，也面向商业用户，因此国防支出也在推动更广泛的安全投资的增长。.

航空航天制造业 尽管并非仅用于军事用途，但这补充了这一情况。GE Aerospace宣布，仅在2026年就将投资超过1.1亿欧元用于欧洲的新生产设施，其中包括在波兰投资1500万欧元用于磨削和加工设备，并在捷克投资800万欧元用于精密加工和组装工具，此外还实施了旨在覆盖该地区数千名学生的员工发展计划。.

主权能力改变了房地产的方程式

今年，在防务工业报道中不断出现一个词：主权能力。它指的是能够在欧洲本土生产关键军事技术的能力，而不是依赖于美国或亚洲供应商的进口。这一战略思维的转变直接影响了制造能力建设的方式和地点。.

国防工业并非像一般的工业企业那样。它通常涉及以下几点：

• 装甲车辆和弹药组装的更重地面载荷和结构规范
• Specialised permitting for hazardous materials and dangerous goods, often falling under Seveso-level regulation
• 更高的安全和访问控制要求，相比传统物流或制造空间而言更为严格。
• 靠近现有国防工业集群，以及拥有熟练且具备安全保障资质的工作人员
• 交付时间表以政府规定的硬性期限为基准，而非典型商业租赁周期为依据。

Governments and prime contractors alike are discovering that the constraint on rearmament isn’t only funding. It’s finding facilities that can be permitted, built, and made operational fast enough to matter. Industry analysts have consistently flagged workforce shortages and supply chain bottlenecks, particularly in electronics and specialised materials, as the practical limits on how quickly capacity can scale, even now that money is no longer the obstacle it once was.

值得坦率地指出的一点是结构性紧张关系。对比中东欧地区防务产业格局的研究指出，尽管这些经济体在民用工业方面与其他西欧资本和供应链有着深厚的融合，但它们历史上一直将其国防部门与同样程度的外国渗透隔离开来。匈牙利与莱茵金属公司和空客直升机公司的国有合作模式直接体现了这一本能。对于在该地区运营的设施提供商和工业合作伙伴而言，这意味着最具可持续性的作用往往在于提供基础设施和加快交付速度，而非拥有防务产业资产本身。.

What Does Central Europe’s Industrial Map Look Like for Defence? 

这些具备最佳条件应对这一浪潮的国家都有着共同的特点：既有成熟的工业基础设施，又有熟练的制造业劳动力；开发商拥有内部的复杂设施许可专业知识，能够为危险性较大的设施提供许可；而且他们拥有充足的可用且已预先许可的土地，能够根据瞬息变化的需要迅速开展项目建设。.

这种结合在历史上一直是 CTP 的核心市场，而国防领域早已在该市场内占据着主导地位。包括 KNDS、Dynamit Nobel Defence、Safran、Latecoere、Honeywell 和 Demgy EIS 等制造商如今都在 CTPark 网络内开展业务。. See 客户故事 和 我们的解决方案 for some examples.

What that work has surfaced is a fairly consistent set of requirements. A permitted landbank close to existing industrial parks. In-house teams that handle zoning and dangerous goods permitting directly rather than outsourcing it. A high-security baseline including stand-alone buildings, controlled access environments, and 24 hour monitoring. Flexible construction that can absorb changes mid-build as technical requirements evolve. And customisation experience spanning clean rooms, electrostatic discharge flooring, and vibration-free laboratories.

Those are the capabilities defence-adjacent manufacturing needs, whether the buyer is a prime contractor, a Tier 1 supplier, or a company scaling into the sector for the first time. Clean-room and compliance-ready requirements overlap strongly with life science, as covered in 制药公司在CEE地区正在建设什么. 

Defence’s return to Central Europe isn’t a temporary spike tied to a single conflict. It reflects a structural decision by European governments to rebuild sovereign industrial capacity for the long term, backed by the kind of multi-year, multi-billion-euro funding commitments that don’t unwind quickly even if the security situation eventually stabilizes. For the region’s industrial real estate market, that means demand for specialised, fast-to-deliver, compliance-ready space is only getting started.

在中欧地区扩大国防或双用途生产？ 预约通话 与 CTP 的当地团队合作，或者获取 CTP 的《防御策略手册》，其中包含五套针对速度、资本、合规性、增长和市场进入方面的成熟策略。.

Author – CTP Research Team
Last updated  – 16 October 2026